

# AN T-ÓGLÁC

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## AS YOU WERE.

There is no necessity at the present time to impress upon the soldiers of the Irish Republic the importance of keeping themselves prepared for all eventualities. The fighting men of Ireland realise that, whatever the issue of the negotiations now proceeding between our Government and the Government of England, the rights and liberties of the Irish people will still require the safeguard of the armed manhood of Ireland and that the efficiency of that safeguard is vital to the Irish nation. Great things have been achieved in the past and the truce found the armed young men of Ireland not war-weary but at a higher pitch of discipline, zeal, energy, morale and effectiveness than ever before. That position must be obtained and improved upon. Difficulties in the matter of training which existed during the period when every man had to consider himself on active service are now obviated by the suspension of hostilities and full advantage should be taken of this to ensure that if the services of our troops are called upon again they will be a more highly trained condition than ever before. We have learned much in practice which could not have been learned so effectively by the theoretical training of the early years of the Volunteers. The lessons of the War of Independence will not be easily forgotten and men who acquired much of their knowledge and experience in the firing line will understand how to avail themselves fully of the training rendered feasible by normal conditions. They will remember also that the suspension of hostilities does not justify the smallest relaxation of vigilance. In peace or in war times it is equally the duty of an army to guard carefully its military secrets, and a truce is not the same thing as peace.

The nation looks to its soldiers with confidence to continue worthy of the great traditions they have made

and the great responsibility laid on their hands. The Army of the Irish Republic will not rest on its laurels but will carry on its work with unabated cheerfulness, energy and enthusiasm, prepared for every contingency that may arise.

## INSTRUCTIONS IN HANDLING TELESCOPE

The man of ordinary intelligence, I imagine, could be made quite handy with a telescope by a fortnight's training of the following kind:—

Select a hill (distance to vary according to atmospheric conditions.) On this hill should be placed a number of objects, such as dummies behind rocks, muzzle of rifle sticking up, hats over stones or bushes, if hill is timbered, horses at edge of timber, any small object such as man's head on or near sky line, a man crawling from cover to cover.

The squad under instruction should then be taken out by an instructor who knows what objects are on the hill and their position. The squad should at first be furnished with glasses on tripods so that they may learn to focus, search the ground, etc. When they have learnt this, each man should be given a certain time to spy and write down what he can see. When a certain amount of proficiency has been attained the tripods should be done away with, and the men taught to spy, using the rifle as a rest, or prone with one knee up, the other foot resting on the knee, a most useful and steady position.

The squad should be taught to use the glass with both eyes open, the hand nearest the face being used, if necessary, to screen the unemployed eye. This entirely relieves the strain on the eyes, which is otherwise great, and can be detected by closing one eye and looking hard at a fixed object for a short time with the other, then open the eye and watch the dilation of the pupil.

Telescopes in damp weather have an awkward trick of fogging up. This can, to a great extent, be obviated by the use of a greasy substance called Glasoline, which is used on spectacles to prevent them dimming. A small quantity is rubbed on, and the glasses then polished with a silk handkerchief.

## MILITARY PHOTOGRAPHY.

Photography can be utilised for a variety of purposes, but in some cases a lot will depend on the camera in conjunction with its lens or lenses, and the user. Good work can be done with the cheap camera for the photography of buildings, operations and other objects on a large scale, and on some cameras (non-focussing) it will be possible to add an additional lens or 'attachment' as it is called, that will allow of a large image being taken at a short distance, such for instance as the copying of documents etc. In all cases, however, the *plate* camera will have an advantage over the film camera, because with a plate camera one photograph can be taken and immediately developed whereas with the film camera, six photographs will have to be taken before one can be developed. This is a defect that can be easily remedied, as adaptors to take plates or *Film-Packs* (cut films used instead of plates and for the same purpose as Roll Films i.e., to allow of them being changed in daylight) can be obtained to fit any Roll Film camera.

Some of the uses that Photography can be put to are as follows:—

**Despatches.** Important despatches instead of being written or typed could be photographed *but not developed*, the plate or better still a cut film, could be placed in a light tight envelope. When it would reach the other end it could be easily developed out. The advantage of this method would be that if it fell into the hands of the enemy, the message would be totally destroyed when they would open the packet and expose the film to the light.

**Copying.** Important plans, drawings or sketches, in cases where it would be impossible to obtain the originals, or where there would be a great loss of time in copying out by hand. Daylight would not be needed for this if Magnesium ribbon is used instead. by burning 2" of Magnesium ribbon you will obtain an exposure equal to 30 seconds of actinic or day-light. Pages in books can be copied exact size *without* a camera, but some hours would be required in order to do it; the result would be a photographic image.

**Publicity.** Photographs of scenes of operations, results of ambushes etc., to send to Press. Undesirable faces could be blocked out immediately after development or retouched and plate re-photographed and original destroyed to prevent it falling into the hands of the enemy who might use it for identification purposes.

**Details.** Photographs of Buildings, Barracks, Streets, spaces etc., for details or mapping.

**Instructional.** (Infantry Training) Operations—

Scenes of Operations— cover etc.

(Signalling) Apparatus—Methods of Setting up

—Different types of Telegraph Poles—Distributors etc.,

(Sappers) Attacking of Telegraph Poles, Wire cutting, Trenching, Tree felling etc.,

(Engineering) Setting up Charges—Electric and Ordinary—Laying Charges—Tamping etc., Photographs of Permanent ways, different types —Chairs, Sleepers, Fishplates, wedges etc.,

(Various) Intricate Mechanisms of Revolvers rifles etc., and other machines—Laying Mines etc.

(Operations) The scene of an ambush for details of cover points of attack etc., of Barracks for details—During operations or attacks day or night

(using a Flash light pistol at night for illumination —the flash of light in this case would take but 1/2

second and could be arranged not to betray positions and at the same time dazzle the enemy)

for publicity or instructional purposes.

The above are but a few details of the many uses to which the camera can be put. A photograph can be taken by an ordinary camera and a copy of the result ready within half an hour.

## PRINCIPLE OF OUTPOSTS.

The general idea with which outposts are pushed forward to protect an army is the same in every class of warfare. A fraction of the force is detailed to act as a screen to the bulk of the force, enabling this to rest and to temporarily abandon fighting formation even when in proximity to the enemy.

The detachments on outpost duty remain on the alert ready to act at a moment's notice. This is the case whether the troops they are safe-guarding are engaged in operations against disciplined and regular forces or are opposed to semi-civilised adversaries, guerillas or savages. But the fundamental principles of the organisation of an outpost service differ very materially in the case of small wars from what is generally considered right and proper in great campaigns.

The test of actual experience in operations all over the globe, against opponents most diverse in their methods of fighting, goes to show that outpost need generally, at least by day, consist only of a chain of sentries found by picquets pushed out a short way from the main body. Supports are seldom required, reserves scarcely ever. The distance of the chain of sentries, or of vedettes when these are used, from the main body is relatively small. But the procedure necessarily varies greatly by day from that suitable at night, and in hill warfare a quite different procedure must frequently be adopted. (From "Small Wars," by Major Caldwell, a volume issued by the British War Office.)

## GENERAL NOTES

The report of the Officer in charge of the ambushing party at Templeogue Dublin on June 17th. contains the following.—

"At 9,30 P.M. the enemy advertised his approach from Terenure by firing shots. The Lieut. presumed they had been ambushed there and steadied his men to give them a further rattle. Immediately the scout on road closed the gate the Lieut. and men took up position. Two grenades (which exploded simultaneously) were thrown. The two shot-guns and the two revolvers were emptied at the passing tender, which was only partly covered with canvas and moving at about 12 miles per hour. The car appeared to be hard hit and travelled furiously towards Tallaght firing about 6 shots as they went, hitting a dairyman at a place between the cottages and the bridge. One of the bombers picked up a rifle which fell out of the tender, leaving about 4 caps (khaki) on the road. The whole party having acted with the utmost coolness retired. Enemy casualties are not known. The Company Intelligence Officer subsequently reported that the side of tender was badly damaged and that three soldiers were lying in the bottom of the car. He also states that the tender contained eight men and the driver all apparently under the influence of drink. They had been making targets of the public between Terenure and Templeogue. They were on their way to Kilbride Camp and had probably target practice on the brain."

Dublin Castle Publicity Department on May 14th issued a report to the effect that "three R.I.C. tenders were ambushed by about 100 armed men at Kilmorna near Listowel at 1.15 p.m. on Thursday (May 12th.) Two R.I.C. were slightly wounded. The dead bodies of three unknown rebels were found at the scene of the ambush and it is believed they suffered heavy casualties. Crown Forces also captured a number of shot-guns, revolvers and ammunition." This report is a tissue of lies from start to finish. There was no ambush, no fight, no capture of weapons. Four unarmed Volunteers were surprised and captured by a party of Black and Tans at Kilmorna. They were beaten and tortured and then brought to a field to be shot. One of them made a dash for liberty and though wounded succeeded in escaping and lives to tell the tale. His three companions were murdered

The Dublin Brigade May Diary for June shows that there were 93 operations during the month. There were 30 attacks on forces in lorries, 4 attacks on troop trains, 6 raids for mails, 9 sniping operations 6 seizures of telephone equipment and many captures of enemy stores and military equipment.

On 13 occasions enemy property was seized and destroyed including food stuffs, clothing, motor tyres and £1,000 worth of equipment of a pumping station. The British Army Transport Depot at Parkgate Street, was burned to the ground and the Press estimated the damage at close on one million pounds. In this fire 6 armoured cars, 67 motor bicycles fitted with machine gun attachments, a large number of cars of various makes and war materials were destroyed. Two automatics, 2 revolvers and ammunition were captured from Auxiliaries and 4 motor cars were also captured.

The following is part of a report received from the O.C. Longford Brigade:—

"On Saturday night 18th June I was sending a Machine Gunner to the O.C., Roscommon Brigade to give instructions in the Hotchkiss Gun. He was accompanied by my orderly, and when passing through Drumlish they were called on to halt by an auxiliary in charge of an enemy patrol who came on cycles and were accompanied by a lorry and armoured car. Fire was opened on them from the outside of a house about 40 yards away. My orderly—Thomas Kelleher—fell dead, shot through the heart. His comrade thinking he was only wounded, lifted him and carried him away about 50 or 60 yards in spite of heavy fire from the enemy. Seeing him go they rushed after him. He had to drop Kelleher and take cover, but before going he took Kelleher's revolver and some despatches. He was then wounded in the leg, a small piece of the shin bone being shattered but managed to escape and walked three miles to where I was. We at once proceeded to Drumlish with 6 rifles (as many as we could mobilise at the time) but the enemy were a short time gone when we arrived. The Gunner's plucky action deserves special commendation. Kelleher was one of the noblest young men we had in the Brigade, and a brave soldier. He was wounded on two previous occasions in ambushes."

The South Wexford Brigade report for May shows that there were four attacks on Barracks and three attacks on Police Patrols. There were eleven raids on mails, and telegraph wires or poles were cut on 9 occasions. Among enemy property captured were 24 gallons of petrol consigned to the R.I.C., two bicycles, a telescope, and a typewriter and stores in a Coastguard Station. Roads were cut or blocked in 6 places. In a house in Campile seven pounds of gunpowder, 10 yards of white fuse, 15 dozen cartridges (12 bore) and 2, 250 shot-gun caps were captured.

The report of the South Wexford Brigade for June shows that during the month 8 bridges were destroyed in the area and roads were trenched or blocked on 18 occasions. Mails were seized 8 times and wires were cut 3 times. Belfast goods were seized and destroyed on 2 occasions and the enemy Courthouse at Wexford was burned down.

North Roscommon Brigade reports a successful attack on an enemy patrol outside Tarmon Barracks on July 2nd.

The diary of the Athlone Brigade shows that a number of Postmen were held up and deprived of their bicycles and mails on three occasions, resulting in the capture of 10 bicycles. Two bridges were destroyed and there was extensive road-cutting and blockading in the area. On the 13th. June 2 Volunteers held up four enemy Military Sergeants and captured a short Webley revolver. They then released them.

### NOTES FROM REPORTS

"We took up a position at 6 o'clock in an old house near the embankment. It was then too late to do any preliminary loosening of bolts as the position is overlooked by Jonesboro Police Barracks. At 7.45 a.m. the Pilot Engine passed, the first troop train at 8.15 and the second at 9.50. *We then loosened a length of rail. Our scouts on the Fathom Mountains were able to see the train leaving Goraghwood and signalled our train to us. At 10.15 we lifted the rail and arrested 4 linesmen who observed us working at it. The train came along at 10.30.*"

### RAPID DIVISIONAL TRAINING

The following extracts from a Divisional Report will help to show the way in which sound training can be imparted in a way to quickly spread down through all ranks. It must be again repeated that circumstances vary greatly from one Divisional Area to another and each Divisional Command must turn its own circumstances to the best possible advantage. The Divisional Report in question says:

"The officers who attended the Training Camp were drawn from the——and two——Brigades. Their ranks were Battalion O.C's and two Brigade Staff Officers from each Brigade. The——Officers were not there as most of the Officers from that Brigade had already been trained.

The result of training on O.T.C. was a marked improvement all round in their military knowledge and outlook and I think it will be reflected in a short time by increased efficiency throughout the Division.

The general idea is—the officers who were trained (Battalion O.C's.) will immediately take their Company Captains and Lieutenants and form classes of their own. These subordinate Officers will in turn transmit the training to the Companies.

Another training camp is starting on the 31st. July for Engineers and Signallers. It will be composed of the officers from each Brigade and the Divisional Officers of above Departments.

## THE ORGANISATION OF PROTECTION

Our Protective Service should be as widespread, as extensive, and as complete as our Organisation itself. Our men live in every part of the country and are at all times liable for duty, hence if the necessary arrangements are made they can act as a veritable army of scouts. Thus day and night scouts should be posted in all battalion areas. These should be out at all times—reasonable care being taken to safeguard them in bad weather.

The Battalion is the unit through which Protection of an area should be organised—the Brigade is too large, and the Company too small. The Battalion Commandant should have a system of Weekly Protection Reports from his Companies and a system of inspection for guards. No slackness should be tolerated on the part of companies in this respect.

Within each Company area Observation Points must be selected and manned regularly. These points must be so chosen as to guarantee that no part of the area remains uncovered. Each Company should know the Observation Points of adjoining Companies. In selecting observation points the following principles should be observed: (a) All roads into the area and all roads from Enemy posts must be watched, (b) The Points of Observation should if possible be suitable as communication centres. Cyclists and sound or light or other signals must also be organised all over the area linking these points.

In reality everything depends on the speed with which any information is transmitted from the Point from which the enemy is first observed. The scheme of Mobilisation should be so simple that it can be set going at express speed. If this can be done not only will the whole area be warned, but the several companies will be ready, standing to as units well in hand, should any opportunity for offensive action present itself.

It is obvious that a thorough-going Protection system like this would make very much easier the Higher Administration of an area. There would be no delay or hesitation about where to hold Brigade or Battalion Councils, Inspections etc; because these could then be held anywhere without danger of surprise. Again, Active Service Units would have their duties much lightened because the local units would be furnishing the Protection most of the time and the A.S.U. would get all the more rest.

Evidently when overhauling the Organisation and Administration of an area it is necessary to examine it from the side of Protection especially. If it fails with respect to this it is faulty through and through. A protective network spread over all the area must be fitted on to the local Organisation wherever such is not already the case.