

# AN T-OGLAIC

THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE IRISH VOLUNTEERS.

Vol. III. No. 22.]

AUGUST 19, 1921.

[Price Twopence.

## THE FUTURE

The communications between the Government of the Irish Republic and the British Government have now been made known to the public and will serve to emphasise to the officers and soldiers of the Irish Republican Army the paramount importance of being prepared for every contingency that may arise from the military point of view. Now as always the safeguarding of the rights and liberties of the Irish people depends upon the Irish Republican Army. It is our business to be as efficient and highly trained as possible and ready for every emergency. No opportunity should be neglected of improving our drill and training and making ourselves truly effective members of the Irish Republican Army. The Republic is and will be. It remains for us to do our best in its service realising that the sacrifices we have made may be less than any we will be called on to make. The future lies with us if we do our utmost.

## THE TRUCE IN THE SOUTH

The following is the report of Commandant T. Barry, Chief Liaison Officer for what is known as the "Marital Law Area" on the circumstances which led to the refusal of himself and his fellow officers to co-operate with enemy military officers:—

I was appointed in the early part of the truce by G.H.Q., I.R.A. through the Adjutant General to act as liaison officer for Cork County. I received instructions to get into touch immediately with enemy O.C. 17th Infantry Brigade. When I received these instructions I was at H.Q. Cork Brigade and in uniform I proceeded to the city of Cork and on arrival there notified the enemy of my presence in city. This officer replied that he would see me at 3. o'clock of that date. Two enemy officers in uniform brought that message to my offices. I was in uniform also.

About an hour later Brigadier General Higginson called me up on the telephone and asked me if I was in uniform. I replied that I was. He then stated he

would not see me in uniform. I replied it was not my intention to enter Victoria Barracks in uniform but that I had worn uniform for the past twelve months and would continue to wear it when and where I pleased.

I went to meet Brig. Gen. Higginson at the appointed time in mufti. I was conducted first to General Strickland and after some preliminary remarks he said, "you are the representative of Mr. De Valera here." I replied "I am not, I want you to understand that I am an officer appointed by G.H.Q., I.R.A. to meet you and co-operate in carrying out Truce Terms." He stated he did not recognise the I.R.A. nor would he do so. I then stated I could not deal with him except in the status of officer of an the I.R.A., and if he was not willing to deal with me in that capacity I would leave without further delay. He nodded assent and asked me to speak with Brig. Gen. Higginson, with whom I adopted the same attitude,

Major Cherry of the 6th Divisional Staff objected to the local paper, "Cork Examiner" describing me as Commandant Barry. All my complaints were registered on the official notepaper of the I.R.A., headed Oglaiġ na h-Eireann. The enemy refused to deal with any complaints registered on that notepaper, or any complaints purporting to emanate from the I.R.A.

About four days after my first appointment I was appointed to the post of Chief Liaison Officer for "Martial Law" Area. Reports received from all Liaison Officers in "Martial Law" area at once showed that all enemy Brigade Commanders were acting in a similar manner to Higginson in Cork. Consequently I convened a meeting of all Liaison Officers, at Mallow and stated to them there that the only capacity in which they could deal with the enemy was as officers of the I.R.A. I instructed them to cease all co-operation with the enemy until such time as I would hear from G.H.Q.

They were not to send or receive any communication or discuss any matter by any means with the enemy. This impasse was considered and discussed in Dublin with Castle officials, but during this time, and since, the enemy have been continually breaking the truce. As a matter of fact the enemy police, fully armed, paraded up and down in front of my offices and have seized two of my motor cars. Copyrighted by the National Archives

(Continued on bottom of column 2 page 19)

## THE BATTLE OF TOURMAKEADY

### "NO SURRENDER"

The following is a detailed account of the fight at Tourmakeady on May 3rd. from the O.C. of the South Mayo Brigade:

Having previously observed that the enemy carried the monthly pay to Derrypark Police Station on the 3rd. of each month, I decided to intercept them at a point between Ballinrobe and that station called Tourmakeady.

On May 3rd. I arrived there in the early morning with 60 troops under my command, and having previously inspected the ground and having decided on the best points I placed my men in three positions—as I expected 3 lorries—with about 200 yards between each position. At about 1 o'clock p.m. the first car (a Ford) was sighted and this was allowed to proceed to the further party who engaged it, according to plan, the driver being instantly killed and the car running into the ditch. After a short sharp engagement the remaining three were also shot dead. Three rifles, three revolvers, and holsters, etc., were captured.

By this time the other car (a Crossley) containing 10 or 12 enemy was half way between the other two positions when it pulled up. The two parties engaged them and the enemy got out and took cover and a fight lasting for half an hour ensued. In this battle my troops were at a great disadvantage as the enemy used rifle grenades, mainly, and rifles, whereas, my party had but a few rifles and the remainder shot-guns and the distance for the latter was too great. Seeing there was no chance of dislodging him after half an hour and fearing enemy reinforcements might arrive I ordered my men to retreat to the hills which was done successfully, my troops having suffered no casualties.

In this fight, the enemy suffered heavily. After getting on to the hills I dismissed the men who lived in the locality and ordered the remainder numbering 30 to rest there as they were a bit fatigued;

After resting about an hour, the scouts reported activity towards Ballinrobe and on training my glasses in that direction I counted 24 lorries coming towards the scene of the ambush. I have since learned that they were summoned through a wireless installation in Derrypark Barracks immediately the fight commenced, the lorries coming from Galway, Claremorris and Ballinrobe. Some of them rushed up the roads on our S.E. and S.W. the remainder remaining South and opening fire on the hills.

My party retreated North for a distance, only to find the way barred by enemy troops from Castlebar and Westport who on sighting us opened fire with Lewis guns and rifles. This again forced us back I then picked the best cover available and ordered my men to get down. The enemy fire was now most intense. We were bombarded from all sides. Under the great strain the

troops were quite cool, each man being determined to make the best use possible of his diminished supply of ammunition and the cry was "No Surrender."

It was now about 4 o'clock and the enemy made a few futile efforts to close in on us but we beat them back. At this time I was severely wounded, a bullet passing through my forearm at the elbow point and issuing on the inside of the arm near the armpit, fracturing the bone. The Brigade Adjutant crept up to dress me and had slit open my sleeve when a voice from behind us called "Hands up." On turning round we recognised an enemy officer, who was divested of his cap, coat, and putties, and carrying a rifle. He was in charge of eight men but these did not approach as near as he who was within 20 yards of us and the remaining eight just outside the hillock. The Adj. picked up his rifle to engage him, but the other had the advantage and shot him dead through the body, the bullet afterwards passing through my back under the right shoulder blade inflicting a flesh wound. Instantly one of my troops fired on the Officer and knocked the rifle out of his hand with a shot gun and gave him the contents of the second barrel in the stomach, 10 grains of buck-shot being since removed from it. The officer then turned and ran, falling after going 20 yards. He is also believed to have been struck by a bullet. On his eight men seeing him fall they also turned and ran getting caught between their own fire and ours six of them were seen to fall.

We managed to hold them at bay after this, my troops fighting like demons, and the enemy seemed to lose his temper as he kept pouring a constant stream of lead for perhaps half an hour without ceasing. In this way the fight went on until the night fell when at 10.30 the enemy troops were recalled with the exception of a guard who kept firing up Verey lights until next morning. We managed to make our escape during these few hours, after a tiring day's fighting.

It would be pretty hard to give any accurate account of the enemy casualties on the hills but they must be considerable for in some instances they were cut down by their own machine-gun fire, and the fact of their leaving their dead and wounded on the hills until next day speaks for itself. I saw 2 policemen and 2 soldiers killed and one officer wounded in front of our position as well as six soldiers who were knocked out but cannot say whether dead or wounded. The casualties on my side were:—

- 1 Killed (M.J. O'Brien, Brigade Adjutant)
- 1 Seriously wounded (myself)
- 1 Slightly wounded (a private)
- 8 Shot-guns were captured by the enemy.

It has also been reported to me that one policeman was found dead in a wood where they took up a position at the ambush. One policeman was killed outside Kinnury village where he was going to

fight, and one was killed on the Tourmakeady side of the hill,

I have also received definite information that there were 600 enemy troops engaged on the hills that day. Owing to this action 3 enemy Police Barracks were evacuated in the district, viz. Derrypark, Kinnury and Cuilmore, the R.I.C. men being ordered to be ready to leave within 24 hours.

Following the ambush the police murdered a young boy named Feeney from Ballinrobe and afterwards wrecked his house. They also burned the co-operative store, another man's house as well as a gate lodge at Tourmakeady. The week following 15 policemen drove out in private motor cars and burned the late Adjutant's house as well as that of a man named Burke.

The West Mayo Column sent some of their men to our assistance, hearing from an outside source that the fight was in progress, but the distance did not permit their turning up until well into the night when they found the fight was all over.

My first report to G.H.Q. was not so much in detail as this, as I was not in a position to write it, owing to my hand, and owing to the weak state I was in, having constantly bled from the time I was wounded until late next morning. A man who was arrested, detained and since released states that he saw 10 soldiers who were courtmartialled for desertion at Tourmakeady and sentenced to, from 6 months to 18 months.

## PASSING ON MESSAGES

"All subordinate commanders are responsible for keeping their respective superiors, as well as their neighbouring commanders, regularly informed of the progress of events and of important changes in the situation as they occur." All ranks should notice what takes place within their view and hearing, and report it accurately and at once to their immediate superiors, who must pass the information on to the higher commanders and to neighbouring units. This is the foundation of co-operation in war and is essential not only in battle but at every stage of a campaign.

The senior of any body of troops is responsible for forwarding messages to their destination.

The passing of verbal orders and messages is to be reduced to a minimum owing to the liability to errors in transmission. In the firing line, however, orders and messages must usually be passed verbally, and this should be done as quickly as possible, as a rule from squad commander to squad commander.

## AIDS TO JUDGING DISTANCE

It is useful to know that when the rifle is held in the aiming position the blade pattern foresight covers a man standing at 400 yards and a man kneeling at about 250 yards. If the bolt of the rifle is removed,

a glance taken through the bore—the eye being in the same position as when firing—with the rifle rested, it will be found that, at 300 yards, a man of average height, standing, just fills the barrel.

When two men could be fitted (one above the other) in the barrel, the range is between 500 and 600 yards. If, in the firer's opinion, three standing men would fill the bore, the range would be about 800 yards.

Although it is recognised that no hard and fast rules can be laid down, owing to the varying strength of men's eyesight, rapid progress has been made by normal sighted men, under normal atmospheric conditions, when acting upon the following rules.—

At 200 yards. All parts of the body are distinctly seen.

At 300 yards. The outline of the face is slightly confused. The buttons resemble a stripe.

At 400 yards. Outline of body remains normal, but the face is not seen except under favourable circumstances.

At 500 yards. The body begins to taper slightly from the shoulders. Movements of the limbs are easily discerned.

At 600 yards. The head appears a mere dot, details are no longer distinguishable, tapering of the body very noticeable.

Between 700 and 800 yards. The head is only distinguished with difficulty.

From 800 to 1,200 yards. Single men resemble a stump.

Seeing that the upper part of a man's body will be most frequently exposed on service special attention should be paid to emphasising (1) the appearance of the head and shoulders at various ranges; (2) the size of the head at different distances; (3) up to what range the face can be discerned; (4) when the head is lost sight of, etc.

## GENERAL NOTES

A report from Cork No. 3 in the June 10th issue of AN T-OGLACH stated that on May 11th. the 1st. Lieutenant "D" Company, Barryree, while in company with two other men, all unarmed, was fired on by enemy forces and killed by an explosive bullet fired by Major Percival, Essex Regiment. The following report of a fine action by the Captain of Ballinspittle Company in which he engaged a number of the enemy single-handed, is interesting.

"It was arranged that four men armed with rifles and revolvers should go on to Old Head Station on 20th May 1921. At the spot where the men were to mobilise, the enemy column under Major Percival appeared. Only the Captain of Ballinspittle had

arrived at the mobilisation point at the time having three rifles and ammunition also two revolvers. Major Percival seeing him opened fire on him emptying two revolvers but did not succeed in hitting him. He engaged Percival, who was 200 yards away from his men, and knocked him over with his second shot. He then got away saving his rifles and revolvers."

The diary of the Mid-Clare Brigade for May showed incessant Volunteer activity in that area. The barricading and trenching of roads all over the area was carried out almost daily. The report says that "no sooner had the enemy cleared a road than our men rendered it impassable again." All the Rate Books for the County were seized and deposited in a safe place. Ambushing parties were frequently in position but the enemy rarely came out. The Active Service Unit marched openly through a Battalion Area in broad daylight but failed to come in contact with the enemy anywhere. On the 19th. Tiermaclane R.I.C. Barracks was sniped at. The R.I.C. kept sending up Verey lights for 3 hours after and enemy Verey lights were also sent up from Ennis, Clare Castle, and Kildysart but no reinforcements came out until 11 a.m. on the following day. There were armed fights on the 22nd and 27th. On the 21st. a patrol of 12 marines was attacked in Ballyvaughan. Our troops captured 4 rifles, 4 bayonets and 200 rounds of ammunition.

A report from the Tipperary No. 3 Brigade shows that on the 19th. June 3 armed officers (enemy) were captured by 4 Volunteers, one only of whom was armed.

Tuam Brigade reports wire-cutting and road-trenching all over the brigade area, during the last fortnight of June. Mails were raided throughout the area 3 times during the fortnight. The report says:—"We had 6 ambushes prepared within the fortnight, but they would not come out. It is very hard to get them in this area." On June 26th. an R.I.C. patrol was attacked at Milltown within 150 yards of their barracks.

Athlone Brigade reports that on July 2nd. 3 Volunteers attacked Captain Tully and four R.I.C. men who were in a private car near Drumraney Chapel. After a fight lasting 15 the enemy retreated into the Chapel Yard and the men had to cease firing for fear of the bullets entering the Chapel or the Parochial House. "Another obstacle in the way of our men was that the enemy had two hostages on the car so that they had to fire with great caution and judgement." On the 3rd July there was a conflict between Black-and-Tans and Volunteers at Ballymore. The report adds:—"A bomb was placed by Military between stones that were taken off the road near Tang. Some Volunteers discovered it, placed their fingers on the lever and removed the stones. They then put the pin in the bomb."

A report from East Clare shows that the O.C. 6th. Battalion while engaged on an operation accidentally

came in contact with an enemy military patrol of 12 men. Mistaking them for Volunteers he got within 3 yards of the party when the enemy officer fired at him and missed. He immediately levelled his rifle and shot the officer through the chest. He got back to his own men under heavy fire.

The Official report from Cork No. 1 Brigade of the Youghal land mine operation on June 1st. differs materially from that which appeared in the Public Press. It says:—"An armed party of military about 250 strong, left Youghal accompanied by a Band, who were followed by an armed main body. About one mile from the town a land-mine had been laid. This mine was successfully exploded under the main body, the advance guard and band being allowed to pass over. In all there were 15 killed and 45 to 50 wounded. It may be remarked that some band boys were killed and others wounded by flying sharpnel (stones) at a distance of 30 yards from the scene of the explosion."

Cork No. 1 Brigade reports the following activities:—"An explosive charge was placed on a destroyer, lying in Hawlbowlne Dockyard, and successfully exploded. A large plate in the destroyer was blown away, causing a damage of £1,000. This destroyer was being used to patrol the coast. A land mine was exploded under an enemy lorry of soldiers at Carrighthoill. The three young women arrested and courtmartialled in this connection were thinning turnips in an adjacent field at the time and were not aware of the presence of a mining party. on June 24th. at 1 a.m. an enemy column, 200 strong, encamped near Ballinagree, Co. Cork were sniped. Much confusion was created amongst the enemy, who replied wildly and ineffectively with machine gun and rifle fire. They broke camp about 2.30 a.m. same morning."

*(Continued from page 1)*

liaison, work. This was reported to Commandant Duggan, Chief Liaison Officer, and high official of Dublin Castle promised their return.

The next development was that Divisional Commissioner Dunlop, R.I.C., wrote asking that breaches of the truce terms by the police were to be referred to him. I replied that until my two I.R.A. cars were returned I would not consider the question of co-operation with the British authorities for the effective working of the truce. Dunlop replied that one was a stolen car, and he could not recommend its return; however if a permit were procured for the other it would be given back. This I absolutely refused, stating I had driven the cars without a permit, and would continue to do so. In answer Dunlop stated that he was prepared to abide by instructions from Dublin. The position seems unchanged since.

T. B. Barry, Commandant I.R.A.

Chief Liaison Officer



Óglaigh  
na hÉireann  
SUPPORT FORCE IRELAND