

AN T-ÓZLÁC

THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE IRISH VOLUNTEERS.

Vol. III. No. 51.]

APRIL 25th, 1922

[Price Twopence.

OUR PURPOSE.

It is now six years since Patrick Pearse and the men of Easter week fired the first shot in the Liberation War, and all during these six years the Irish people and the Irish Volunteers have been fighting with all their resources, physical, moral, and intellectual, against England. At times during that period the issue seemed doubtful; at times it seemed as if the Nation was in danger of death, but forces mightier than mere human forces were fighting on our side, and at the end of six years we have achieved a success which most Irishmen will agree was beyond our highest hopes.

Our work is not yet complete, and we, the Irish Volunteers, together with the people of Ireland, hold the completion of that work as a sacred trust. But the last hour's work in the day is the hardest, and the last stage in this Liberation War will require the highest discipline and resourcefulness as well as the highest courage.

The history of Europe is full of examples of Nations just missing greatness by reason of some inherent defect. These Nations acted as great Nations up to a certain point, but in the hour of supreme trial, when all their qualities were tested to the uttermost, they failed. Some failed because they were not enduring and patient enough; others failed through false national pride; but one and all failed because of some inherent defect.

Only one thing on earth can prevent this generation of Irishmen from completing the work of liberation, and that is ourselves. If we fail it will be through our own weakness, not our physical weakness, but through spiritual weakness, and for fear we should fail it is our manifest duty to see ourselves as we are, to

know our own weaknesses, and to arm ourselves against possible dangers in the future.

Nations, like men, are easily blinded with national pride, and we must not lose our sense of proportion because we have fought valiantly and with success. Neither must the Army be given the entire credit for our success in the war against England. The people and the Army presented a single front, and the moral forces were just as powerful as the rifle. It should be sufficient for Irish soldiers to feel that they have done their part and the time for self-congratulation should be when complete independence is established, and not now.

Irish Volunteers must not use this breathing space, the first in six years, to get out of hand, to run loose through the country, even to violate the elementary principles of liberty. They had better use the present breathing space to train and prepare themselves for ultimate victory. Liberty, amongst other things, means the rights of the citizen, and, at least, Irish soldiers can prove their devotion to liberty by protecting these rights.

No Nation has shown such heroic devotion to liberty as Ireland. From generation to generation Irishmen have died on the battlefield and scaffold for that ideal. Irishmen abroad have been the most famous soldiers of liberty, due to the fact that Irish liberty has meant a struggle with one of the greatest powers in Europe. Ireland has come to be regarded as the chief Apostle of Liberty. Before we lost our liberties we were the foremost Missionary Nation for Christianity, and now we have inherited a new mission, one that has come to us through generations of suffering, and it is to make manifest liberty in its highest forms.

Those of us who depart from that purpose in

word, or in thought, or in deed, are false to ourselves, and to our whole past as a Nation. In these days of Easter, 1922, when our real worth as an Army is being tested, it is but fitting that we should recall the teaching as well as the deeds of that group of men who made the Rebellion of Easter Week, and especially should we try to understand the spirit of Patrick Pearse, for he was the greatest of that group of men.

Whatever views Irishmen may have as to the methods which Patrick Pearse would favour presently, all Irishmen will agree that once liberty was achieved, Patrick Pearse had a clear conception of what the Irish Nation should be in the future. He had thought out for himself the main outlines of a Gaelic civilisation, and he believed that from a Gaelic civilisation there would arise a higher type of Irish soldier and a higher type of Irish citizen. Pearse taught in his school and in his books that there was an immortal Gaelic spirit, and when that spirit could work freely that there would arise in Ireland a civilisation as famous as that which arose in Greece ages ago.

SOLDIERS OF AN IDEAL.

We can listen with special attention to Pearse's teaching because he was probably the greatest Irishman of this generation, and because he seems to have understood the living spirit which is hidden in every race better than any other Irishman in our time. The Nation is greater than its greatest man, but the teaching of Pearse is very near the real expression of the Nation's purpose and the Nation's desire.

To soldiers, the most instructive thing is his conception of what an Irish soldier should be. Pearse's conception of a soldier was not that of a soldier by trade. To him the real soldier is the soldier of an ideal, the soldier of some great human purpose. We have his own words: "We must recreate and perpetuate in Ireland the knightly tradition of Cuchulainn."

Pearse would have all Irishmen inspired by the story of Cuchulainn and the story of Colmcille, that inspiration, as he said himself: "That made the one a hero and the other a

Saint." He tells us that the noble tradition of the Fianna, the first Irish soldiers, who declared that—

"We, the Fianna never told a lie, falsehood was never imputed to us; strength in our hands, truth on our lips, and cleanness in our hearts;" the Christlike tradition of Colmcille;"

was the most worthy tradition to be followed. He held that the greatest of all Irish soldiers were men who acted according to that tradition, and they were from Sarsfield to Sean McDermott. Pearse's conception of the Irish soldier was a soldier, fearless, steady, disciplined, and courteous, with nothing of the freebooter and nothing truculent about him.

Irish soldiers can be as Pearse desired them, or they can be soldiers according to another tradition, a foreign tradition. All Europe is familiar with the soldier by profession war-hardened and cruel. These soldiers do not fight for an ideal or for their country. They do not respect the rights of the people; they do not believe in liberty, because its tradition is their trade.

We, the Irish Volunteers, can be soldiers as Pearse conceived an Irish soldier, or we can become soldiers in the other sense—to put it simply—man-slayers. If we follow Pearse, then we will be true to our history as a Nation specially devoted to liberty.

It is deplorable, but it is, nevertheless, true, that there are many Irish Volunteers to-day acting rather as the enemies of liberty than its protectors. We must be careful and not allow ourselves to be infected with the disease of English militarism.

There are Irish Volunteers, too, who, without going to the point of English militarism, act as if they own the people; who think it a fine thing to behave like freebooters or buccanners. This is a disgraceful thing. Let them have no doubt about it.

The Irish Republican Army will complete the liberties of Ireland if it is true to itself and to the principles of freedom. On the other hand, its failure and disgrace.

The True Position of the Army.

VAST MAJORITY STAND BY G.H.Q.

TELLING ANALYSIS BY CHIEF OF STAFF.

AUTHORITY OF DAIL EIREANN SUPREME

The present position of the Army as set out in the following statement, issued by the Chief of Staff, reveals the fact that G.H.Q. was never in a stronger position than now, enjoying as it does the loyalty and confidence of a fairly equipped, well-trained and well-disciplined Army, which has the respect and devotion of a grateful people.

The appended summary clearly demonstrates that in 12 of the 16 Divisions G.H.Q. has 75 per cent. of the Army and in the remaining 4 Divisions between 30 and 50 per cent.

CAUSE OF THE DIVISION.

The following official statement has been issued by the Chief of Staff:—

Since Sunday, 26th March, a number of Division and Brigade Conventions and Mobilisations were held. Owing to the gross and wilful misrepresentations which were made in the Press and otherwise against G.H.Q., I.R.A., it is considered necessary to place the true position of the I.R.A. before the officers and men.

Allegiance Pledged to An Dail.

Previous to the establishment of Dail Eireann as the supreme Governing Body in Ireland, the Army was controlled by an Executive elected annually. When the Dail Cabinet was appointed, a Ministry for Defence was created, and the control of the Army passed from the Executive to the Government, and every soldier in Ireland took an oath of allegiance to the Dail. The Minister for Defence appointed the Chief of Staff, who,

in turn, appointed or ratified every other Commissioned Officer in the Army. The Army was thus placed in the same position, as regards the Government, as all other armies. This was our answer and justification when we were called Murderers during the War. While Dail Eireann remains we are bound by our oath of allegiance to it and, if the people of Ireland at the coming election decide that it should continue, then the position of the I.R.A. remains unchanged. If an Executive were set up to control the Army, even by the unanimous decision of the Army, such an Executive would be displaced by the new Dail on the same grounds on which the last Executive was displaced. Should the people of Ireland decide on any form of Government other than Dail Eireann, then the position of the I.R.A. towards such Government will require to be defined.

Majority Rule Banned.

As regards the order prohibiting the Convention, the circumstances which brought this about have been already explained in the statement of the Minister for Defence. When the order from the Dail Cabinet arrived prohibiting the Convention, G.H.Q. had either to obey or resign. Resignation would have been a breach of faith to the authority to which we swore to bear true faith. The Convention was agreed to in hopes of unity in the Army, but it became quite patent, owing to happenings throughout the country, that a Convention, instead of bringing unity, would only give definite shape to the differences that then existed. In fact, when Commandant O'Connor was asked at a meeting if he would accept a majority decision of the Convention if it were unfavourable to his policy, he said "NO," hence it is clear the Convention could not bring unity; moreover, the great majority of the Army would not agree with many of the decisions of the Convention as published in the press, COPYRIGHT MILITARY ARCHIVES policy indicated by the actions of those O'Connell under the Executive since the Convention. na hEireann DEFENCE FORCES IRELAND

Efforts towards Unity.

Mr. O'Connor stated at Rathfarnham on Sunday that his side had done their utmost to secure unity in the Army. The opposite is true. His side has done everything possible to break the unity of the Army, and every effort for unity on the part of G.H.Q. has been frustrated. Previous to the Convention, meeting after meeting and conference after conference between the principal Army Officers were held in Dublin and elsewhere, and every such meeting and conference was held at the instigation of G.H.Q. It was even agreed to allow a **Watching Council to attend meetings of G.H.Q. Staff.** On the Monday previous to the Convention the Minister for Defence and Chief of Staff attended a meeting of the 1st Southern Divisional Staff and Brigade Commandants in a last effort to find agreement, and we succeeded. The following agreement was arrived at between the Minister for Defence, Chief of Staff, and 1st Southern Divisional Staff:—

“A meeting of Divisional and Brigade Commandants with G.H.Q. Staff to be held in Dublin on Thursday, 23rd March. Such meeting to select, from among the Divisional and Brigade Commandants, a Council of eight commissioned to frame definite proposals for associating the I.R.A. with any Government elected by the Irish people, and to put such proposals before the Divisional and Brigade Commandants for agreement preparatory to putting them before the Government.”

Mutineers Cause Army Split.

The O/C. 1st Southern Division promised to recommend the terms of this agreement to a meeting of Divisional and Brigade Commandants of his side, to be held in Dublin on the following Wednesday (four days before Convention). Meeting of Divisional and Brigade Commandants was held, but the agreement was not even mentioned at the meeting, nor were the Officers told that the Minister for Defence or Chief of Staff were in Cork at all. The reason given by the O/C. 1st Southern Division for not producing the agreement is—that a Clause requesting that recruiting for the Civic Guard should cease was not inserted. No such clause was suggested in the agreement at our meeting in Cork. Those who advised the O/C 1st Southern Division not to bring the terms of the agreement before the meeting referred to above are very largely responsible for the Army Split. The Army, free from outside influences, could agree.

In the last statement, issued before the Convention, it was said the Volunteers would not turn

their guns on one another. The I.R.A. standing with the lawfully-constituted authority, G.H.Q., have honoured this statement, and showed themselves worthy of the hitherto unblemished record of the I.R.A. during the past few terrible years. It is painful, however, to think that even a section of the Army of which Ireland was so proud should be guilty of such conduct as the last few weeks witnessed.

The Dictatorship in Practice.

Our barracks and posts in Dublin are attacked nightly with machine gun, rifle fire and bombs. Our lorries conveying supplies to our Depots are ambushed. Our uniformed despatch riders are fired on. Attempts have been made to destroy the Quartermaster-General's Stores and to murder the few faithful Volunteers guarding them. Our sentries have been shot; Volunteers, like Captain Hurley in Galway, have been treated in a most callous and cowardly fashion. Our soldiers in the streets have been attacked. Two members of G.H.Q. Staff, the Adjutant-General and Director of Intelligence, have been fired on by men in uniform carrying rifles and bombs. The plant and premises of the *Freeman's Journal* have been destroyed, and the journal suppressed because it published an official communique from G.H.Q. for the benefit of the Volunteers who might be misled by the many misrepresentations made. Railway lines have been cut which might involve the lives of hundreds of Irish citizens on their way to public meetings. Gunmen have been discovered in secret positions convenient to Oriel House, Amiens Street Station, and other posts. Disgraceful scenes have been connived at or carried out by officers in uniform at public meetings in Castlebar, etc. Wholesale arrests and kidnapping of officers and men who are loyal to G.H.Q. have been carried out, and, before being released, these officers had to resort to hunger-strike, many such officers being still detained. The lives of our officers in some parts of the country have been threatened. They have been dragged out of bed in the middle of the night and treated unmercifully, and at the present moment, in the South and West of Ireland, several officers are “on the run,” and cannot return to their homes under penalty of being shot. Banks have been robbed and foodstuffs confiscated under the guise of the Belfast Boycott. Fowler Hall, presumably the Headquarters of the Belfast Boycott Committee, is closely associated with the mutinous section of the Army. Meetings of the mutineers have been held there, and, after activities in the city, some of the participants were noticed to go there direct.

The foregoing will indicate how very little hope there was for an agreement at a Convention, the demand for which was signed by the principal officers of the present Executive. Under no circumstances could G.H.Q., or those who stand by G.H.Q., agree to such a policy. In not a single instance have our soldiers standing by G.H.Q. acted in a provocative or indisciplined manner, even after attacks had been made on our troops. Men found carrying arms, who took part in those attacks, were arrested on the spot. Their release was ordered, and, in some cases, their revolvers were not even taken from them, but there is a limit to the patience of our troops, and it cannot be expected that such conduct can continue to go unpunished.

Who Stood by the North ?

In an official statement recently issued by Director of Publicity, Four Courts, it is insinuated that only those higher Officers who are now mutinous "fought in Flying Columns during the War and suffered privations." It is not desired to go into this allegation except to say that the War records of the loyal Divisional Commandants will bear examination. How many of the following Officers were "basking in pompous luxury with no thought or desire to help in the fray" ? —

Commandant General of the 1st Northern Div.

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| " | " | " | 3rd | " |
| " | " | " | 4th | " |
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| " | " | " | 2nd | " |
| " | " | " | Midland | " |
| " | " | " | 1st Western | " |
| " | " | " | 3rd Southern | " |

Another false statement which is gaining currency is—that large numbers of Thompson Guns and Ammunition, the property of the 1st Southern Division, consigned to the North, were held at G.H.Q. and diverted elsewhere. The facts are :—

1. No Arms or Ammunition of any sort, the property of any Division in Ireland, was ever held up at G.H.Q. on its way to the North.

2. At the present moment a number of Thompson Guns and Ammunition and other Arms, the property of G.H.Q., and earmarked for the North (previous to the Treaty), is held in 1st Southern Division.

3. No Thompson Guns came into Ireland lately, but, leaving out of consideration those held

in the 1st Southern Division, 75 per cent. of such Guns are in the North.

The motive for such allegations is very sinister, but our sorely-tried people in the North know who stood by them, and who will stand by them again, please God, if occasion demands. The author of above falsehood is a refugee from Belfast who deserted his Division for a position on the Army Executive Staff in the safer atmosphere of Dublin.

Regarding the statement of the Executive that 90 per cent. of the Army stood with the Executive, the following will go to show how far this is correct :—

**1st NORTHERN DIVISION (TYRCONNELL),
FOUR BRIGADES.**

At a Convention held in Ballybofey, 250 officers (Divisional Brigade, Battalion and Company) were present. The entire Divisional Staff-Commandant, Adjutant, Quartermaster, and the Directors of all the special services, except Engineering, are loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 Brigade.—Entire Brigade Staff, except the Vice-Commandant, loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 Battalion.—Staff and all Company Staffs and men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 2 Battalion.—Staff and all Company Staffs and men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 3 Battalion.—Staff and the majority of the Company Staffs and men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 2 Brigade.—Brigade Staff against G.H.Q. (Peader O'Donnell, who is a member of the Executive, has been Brigade Commandant here).

No. 1 Battalion.—The whole Battalion Staffs and all Company Staffs and men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 2 Battalion.—Staff, except Engineer, and all Companies, except two, loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 3 Battalion.—Staff and all Companies except two, loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 4 Battalion.—Staff and all Companies and men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 5 Battalion.—Staff and all Companies and men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 3 Brigade.—All Brigade Staff, except the Vice-Commandant, loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 Battalion.—Majority of Officers and men loyal to G.H.Q.



No. 2 Battalion.—Staff, except Quartermaster, and all Companies, except one, loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 3 Battalion.—Staff and all Company Staffs and men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 4 Battalion.—Majority of Battalion, Staff and Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 4 Brigade.—All Brigade Staff, except Commandant and Adjutant, loyal to G.H.Q. In this case, the Brigade Commandant, S. S. O'Flaherty, was appointed Divisional Commandant by the Executive. He was afterwards displaced.

No. 1 Battalion.—All Battalion Staff, except the Commandant and Quartermaster, and all Companies, except two, loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 2 Battalion.—Staff, except the Commandant, and all eight Companies and Staffs loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 3 Battalion.—All Battalion Officers and Companies loyal to G.H.Q. In this Division 90 per cent. of the Army are loyal to their old Headquarters. It was necessary to go to Cork for a new Divisional Executive, and men are being recruited who never had any connection with the I.R.A. before.

2nd NORTHERN DIVISION (TYRONE AND DERRY), FOUR BRIGADES.

The entire Divisional Staff, except, perhaps, the Quartermaster, are loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 and No. 2 Brigades.—Owing to misunderstanding, these areas went with the Executive, but are now returning as rapidly as they left. Every day brings correspondence from Battalion and Company Officers renewing their allegiance and that of the rank and file to G.H.Q.

No. 3 Brigade.—Brigadier with Executive, but entire Brigade has since repudiated him.

No. 4 Brigade.—Solid with G.H.Q.

3rd NORTHERN DIVISION (BELFAST, ANTRIM, AND DOWN), THREE BRIGADES.

The Divisional Commandant attended the sectional Convention and brought with him the Brigade Commandant and other Delegates. His action has since been repudiated by all three Brigades in writing, and the Brigade Commandants, who were suspended by G.H.Q., have been reinstated. The Divisional Commandant was repudiated by the following members of Divisional Staff:—Quartermaster, Director of Training, Director of Engineering, Director of Signalling, Director of Intelligence, Director of Chemicals, Director of Medical Service, Director of Communications, Commandant 1st Brigade and Staff, Commandant 2nd Brigade and Staff, Commandant 3rd Brigade and Staff. There was then no permanent Divisional Adjutant. A new Divisional Commandant and Adjutant were appointed by the Executive, but each of these is now loyal to G.H.Q. The signed document, which is now in our possession, states that the late Divisional Commandant deliberately misled the Divisional Brigade Officers.

4th NORTHERN DIVISION (ARMAGH AND LOUTH) THREE BRIGADES.

Entire Divisional Staff loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 Brigade.—Two Battalions disloyal. Officers refuse to hear G.H.Q. side of the question. We have confidence, however, in the rank and file if they be not denied their right to hear the true position.

No. 2 Brigade.—Brigade and Battalion and Company Staffs and men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 3 Brigade.—Brigade and Battalion and Company Staffs and men loyal to G.H.Q.

5th NORTHERN DIVISION (MONAGHAN AND CAVAN). THREE BRIGADES.

All members of Divisional Staff loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 Brigade.—All Brigade, Battalion and Company Staffs, and every Soldier in area loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 2 Brigade.—All Brigade Staff, except the ex-Vice-Commandant, loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 Battalion.—All Battalion and Company Officers and men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 2 Battalion.—All Battalion and Company Officers and men, with a few exceptions, loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 3 Battalion.—All Battalion Staff loyal to G.H.Q. In this Battalion Area advantage was taken of the Army split by some disaffected people to re-establish themselves, but the old Volunteer outlook will prevail.

No. 3 Brigade.—All Brigade, Battalion and Company Officers and men loyal to G.H.Q.

1st EASTERN DIVISION (MEATH, WEST-MEATH, AND KILDARE) NINE BRIGADES.

The entire Divisional Staff loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 Brigade.—All Brigade Staff, except Intelligence Officer, loyal to G.H.Q., and three out of four Battalions. The remaining Battalion Staff are disloyal, but the majority of the rank and file stand with G.H.Q.

No. 2 Brigade.—All Brigade Staff with G.H.Q. All four Battalions with G.H.Q., except one Company, which has a local grievance.

No. 3 Brigade.—All Brigade Staff with G.H.Q. Commandant resigned. All six Battalions consisting of 28 Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 4 Brigade.—All Brigade Staff, Battalion Staffs and Company Officers and men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 5 Brigade.—This Brigade (Mullingar) disloyal. There are only three small Battalions in Brigade. In No. 2 Battalion (Kinnegad), 110 out of 175 men stand with G.H.Q. In No. 3 Battalion (Castlepollard), 133 out of 224 stand with G.H.Q. No. 1 Battalion (town) has not yet been organised.

No. 6 Brigade.—All Brigade Staff loyal to G.H.Q. All Battalions and Companies loyal with the exception of a section of one Company.

No. 7 Brigade.—All Brigade Staff, and overwhelming majority of Battalion Companies and men loyal to G.H.Q., but a number of Battalion and Company Officers and men are causing trouble principally owing to grievances of ex-internees, and it is between the farming and labour section of the community. This trouble arose previous to Army split and of course took more definite shape afterwards.

No. 8 Brigade.—All Brigade Staff loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 Battalion.—All Battalion Staff and all Companies loyal to G.H.Q., except three men.

No. 2 Battalion.—All Battalion Staff and all Companies loyal to G.H.Q., except three men.

No. 3 Battalion.—Only about 50 men in this Battalion altogether. Commandant and half the men with G.H.Q. Majority of this Battalion joined regular forces. MALAHIDE and CLOGHRAN Companies with G.H.Q.

No. 4 Battalion.—All Battalion Staff and all Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 9 Brigade.—Brigade Staff disbanded previous to Army split owing to financial troubles. Nos. 1 and 2 Brigades 80 per cent. of the men are loyal. In No. 3 Battalion all the Battalion Officers, Company Officers and men with G.H.Q.

**2nd EASTERN DIVISION.—DUBLIN—
TWO BRIGADES.**

No. 1 Brigade.—In this area, as all Brigade Staff are disloyal, the majority of Battalion and Company Officers followed.

In all fourteen Captains remain loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 Battalion.—250 out of 750 are loyal.

No. 2 Battalion.—400 out of 500 are loyal.

No. 3 Battalion.—900 out of 1,200 are loyal.

No. 4 Battalion.—250 out of 350 are loyal.

No. 5 Battalion.—100 out of 350 are loyal in this Battalion the majority of remainder retired altogether. In all, 1,900 out of 3,150 men from the 1st Dublin Brigade stand by G.H.Q., and this figure does not include 920 men who joined the City "Guard" Battalion, which brings the total for the 1st Dublin Brigade to 2,820 men.

The figures given above may not represent the present strength of the disloyal forces, being based as nearly as possible to pre-truce figures.

No. 2 Brigade.—In this area the Brigade Quartermaster, Intelligence Officer, Medical Officer, Director of Signalling, and Acting Brigade Adjutant, remain loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 Battalion.—All Battalion Staff, except Vice-Commandant, and five out of eight Company Captains, and 250 out of 400 men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 2 Battalion.—The Staff disloyal, but 190 out of 380 men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 3 Battalion.—The Staff disloyal, but 150 out of 350 men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 4 Battalion.—The Staff loyal, and all Captains except one.

No. 5 Battalion.—Staff loyal, and all Captains except one. In Nos. 4 and 5 Battalions, 650 men are loyal out of 750. In this Brigade area, the majority of those not loyal to G.H.Q. are inactive.

Nos. 1 and 2 Dublin Brigades with Fingal Brigade, now constitute the 2nd Eastern Division. Complete Divisional, Brigade, Battalion and Company Staffs have been set up, and the entire Division is now working satisfactorily.

3rd EASTERN DIVISION.—WEXFORD AND CARLOW.

South Wexford.—Brigade and Battalion Staffs disloyal. Cannot speak for the rank and file, as no effort has yet been made by G.H.Q. to put the position before them.

North Wexford.—Brigade Commandant, Vice-Commandant, Quartermaster, Assistant Quartermaster, Transport Officer and Medical Officer, loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 Battalion.—Majority of Staff disloyal, but new appointments made and Companies again working under new Officers. Four Companies and Staffs entirely loyal, and 85 per cent. of the remaining three Companies loyal, notwithstanding the disloyalty of the Officers.

No. 2 Battalion.—Majority of the Battalion Staff disloyal, but a large majority of the men with G.H.Q.

No. 3 Battalion.—All Battalion Staff, and 75 per cent. of the men loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 4 Battalion.—The majority of the Battalion Staff disloyal, but 60 per cent. of the men with G.H.Q.

Carlow.—Brigade Staff with exception of the Vice-Commandant, loyal to G.H.Q.

1st Battalion.—Staff loyal with exception of of the Vice-Commandant and Intelligence Officer. Eight out of ten Companies stand with G.H.Q.

2nd Battalion.—All Battalion Staff and Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

3rd Battalion.—Staff disloyal, but a new Staff has been appointed, and is working satisfactorily. Six out of eleven Companies are loyal to G.H.Q.

4th Battalion.—With the exception of the Commandant all the Battalion Staff are loyal, also five out of eight Companies.

5th Battalion.—All Battalion Staff and six out of 7 Companies.

6th Battalion.—All Battalion Staff loyal. The majority of the Companies have not yet expressed their opinion on either side. The Brigade Commandant is satisfied that once the situation is put before the men there will be no further trouble. In all 2,454 men stand by G.H.Q. In this area considerable annoyance is caused by a band of men who parade nightly carrying arms, breaking into houses, and committing acts of violence and robbery. A few weeks ago General Headquarters' Post at Tullow was attacked by between 50 and 60 armed men. The garrison consisted of only ten soldiers and an Officer. After a fight lasting 1½ hours, the garrison succeeded in driving off the attackers, and a section of the ten men left the barracks and pursued the attackers for a considerable distance, wounding a number of them. This outpost has not since been interfered with.

MIDLAND DIVISION.—LONGFORD, LEITRIM, AND FERMANAGH.

The entire Divisional, Brigade, Battalion, and Company Officers and men in this Division are loyal to G.H.Q., with the exception of Athlone area and a few disaffected individuals in other areas in Athlone. New Brigade, Battalion, and Company Staffs are set up, and the Brigade is now functioning as if there been no break.

The Brigadier-Commandant Adamson was shot dead while walking alone in Athlone street on Monday night.

The four Western Divisions and the 1st Southern Division have not yet been visited but from reports received we are in a position to give an idea of the position in these areas.

1st WESTERN DIVISION.

Clare and part of Galway; Entire Divisional Staff, with one exception, loyal to G.H.Q.

South-West Galway Brigade.—Majority of Brigade Staff disloyal. New appointments made.

No. 1 Battalion.—Majority of Battalion Staff loyal, and all Companies except one.

No. 2 Battalion.—Majority of Battalion Staff loyal, and all Companies except a section of one.

No. 3 Battalion.—Majority of Battalion Staff loyal, and all Companies except sections of two.

No. 4 Battalion.—Majority of Battalion Staff loyal, and sixty per cent. of men. Remainder mostly joined up since the Truce.

No. 5 Battalion.—Majority of Battalion Staff disloyal, but Battalion recruited and formed up since the Truce.

South-East Galway Brigade.—All Brigade Staff loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 Battalion.—All Battalion Staff, Comdt., and Companies, except half Company, loyal.

No. 2 Battalion.—All Battalion Staff and all Companies except sections of two loyal.

No. 3 Battalion.—All Battalion Staff, except Vice-Comdt., and all Companies, except three, loyal.

No. 4 Battalion.—Majority of Battalion Staff and Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 5 Battalion.—Staff, except Adjutant, loyal, and Companies, except sections of two.

No. 6 Battalion.—Majority of Battalion Staff and Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

West Clare Brigade.—Commandant and Quarter-master disloyal.

No. 1 Battalion.—Fifty per cent. loyal.

No. 2 Battalion.—Seventy per cent. loyal.

No. 3 Battalion.—Ninety per cent. loyal.

No. 4 Battalion.—Ninety per cent. loyal.

No. 5 Battalion.—Twenty per cent. loyal.

Mid Clare Brigade.—Majority of Brigade Staff disloyal. New appointments made.

No. 1 Battalion.—Fifty per cent. loyal.

No. 2 Battalion.—Fifty per cent. loyal.

No. 3 Battalion.—Ninety per cent. loyal.

No. 4 Battalion.—Eighty per cent. loyal.

No. 5 Battalion.—Fifty per cent. loyal.

No. 6 Battalion.—Sixty per cent. loyal.

East Clare Brigade.—Entire Brigade Staff, six Battalion Staffs and 90 per cent. of the Companies loyal.

2nd WESTERN DIVISION.

This Division is not yet organised except South Roscommon Brigade, which Brigade has come over entirely to G.H.Q. with exception of a small section in the neighbourhood of Athlone.

3rd WESTERN DIVISION.

This Division went entirely with the Executive, but there has been a landslide since.

Bundoran Battalion.—Two out of three Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

Manorhamilton Battalion.—Battalion Staff and all seven Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

Garrison Battalion.—Staff and all six Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

Ballintogher Battalion.—All Companies loyal to G.H.Q. except one.

Riverstown Battalion.—All Companies loyal to G.H.Q. except two.

Drumkeeran Battalion.—All Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

Crossna Battalion.—All Companies loyal to G.H.Q. except, perhaps, two. No. 3 Brigade Staff entirely loyal to G.H.Q.

Boyle Battalion.—Battalion Staff and all Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

Elphin Battalion.—Battalion Staff and all Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

Strokestown Battalion.—Battalion Staff and all Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

Carrick-on-Shannon Battalion.—Battalion Staff and all Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

Tubercorry Battalion.—Battalion Staff and all Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

Collooney Battalion.—Four Companies loyal to G.H.Q. and four disloyal.

Ballymote Battalion.—All nine Companies loyal to G.H.Q. with exception of a few small sections.

Gurteen Battalion.—All Battalion Staff and all seven Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

Swinford Battalion.—Loyal to G.H.Q.

Carracastle Battalion.—Loyal to G.H.Q.

A few Battalions in this Division have not yet been reported on, but it may be assumed that they will follow the overwhelming majority of the Army in this Division.

4th WESTERN DIVISION.

The Area is being visited on Thursday, 27th inst. Reports received from the different Battalions are satisfactory.

In Nos. 2, 3 and 4 WESTERN DIVISIONS and 1st SOUTHERN DIVISION, the entire Divisional Staffs being disloyal and largely instrumental in causing the split, naturally other Officers followed the lead given them, but as the cloud of misrepresentation is being broken the subordinate Officers and rank and file are beginning to realise how they have been led astray.

1st SOUTHERN DIVISION.

The Divisional and Brigade Staffs in this Area are disloyal, but from a very large number of Battalion Areas reports have been received showing the desire of the rank and file to stand by their old G.H.Q.

Cork No. 1 Brigade.—

1st Battalion.—In "C" Company alone 120 men are loyal to G.H.Q. In the 4th Battalion seven out of nine Companies are loyal. The 8th Battalion is loyal to G.H.Q. In the 10th Battalion, six Companies are loyal. In the other Battalion Areas reports have not yet come to and except from isolated Companies.

Cork No. 2 Brigade.—

No. 1 Battalion.—Majority of rank and file loyal.

No. 3 Battalion.—Battalion Staff and five out of seven Companies loyal.

No reports from other Battalions.

Cork No. 3 Brigade.—

No. 1 Battalion.—All Battalion Staff and Companies loyal.

No. 3 Battalion.—Majority in each of nine Companies loyal. No reports from other Battalions.

Cork No. 4 Brigade.

Being re-organised. Reports very satisfactory.

Cork No. 5 Brigade.

Two of Brigade Staff loyal.

No. 1 Battalion.—Reports not yet to hand, but majority loyal.

No. 2 Battalion.—Battalion Staff and six Companies out of eight loyal. Remainder of Battalion undecided.

No. 3 Battalion.—All Companies loyal except one. Out of a parade of 250 in this Battalion, 231 stood by G.H.Q.

No reports from other Battalions.

Waterford Brigade.—

Being re-organised, but as Organiser has been arrested, reports have not come to hand. Although a number of Senior Officers are disloyal, 75 per cent. of Junior Officers and men are loyal to G.H.Q.

Kerry No. 1 Brigade.—

No. 2 Battalion.—Battalion Staff and all Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 6 Battalion.—Battalion Staff and all Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

No Reports from other Battalions.

Kerry No. 2 Brigade.—

No reports to hand as yet except from 5th Battalion, where overwhelming majority of the men are loyal to G.H.Q.

Kerry No. 3 Brigade.—

No. 2 Battalion.—Majority of Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 3 Battalion.—Six out of seven Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

No reports from remainder of Companies nor from West Limerick.

2nd SOUTHERN DIVISION.

The Divisional Staff was disbanded for disloyalty some months previous to the Convention. Since then the area has been re-organised, and a number of Units are reporting direct to G.H.Q.

Kilkenny Brigade.—The Brigade Commandant remained loyal to G.H.Q., and disloyal members of the Staff have been replaced.

No. 1 Battalion.—Staff disloyal. New Staff set up. Three Companies entirely loyal; two Companies fifty per cent. loyal, and remaining two Companies are being re-organised.

No. 2 Battalion.—Commandant disloyal. Vice-Commandant and Quartermaster successfully re-organising Battalion. Large majority of five Companies loyal.

No. 3 Battalion.—Commandant, Vice-Commandant, and Quartermaster, and all Companies loyal.

No. 4 Battalion.—Commandant, Adjutant, and five out of seven Companies loyal.

No report on remaining Battalions. The area is being visited.

East Limerick Brigade.—Brigade Staff and all six Battalions and attached Companies loyal.

Mid. Limerick Brigade.—This Brigade Staff, except the Brigade Quartermaster, was suspended for disloyalty previous to the Convention. The area has since been amalgamated with East Limerick. New Brigade, Battalion, and Company Officers have been appointed, and all are now working satisfactorily.

South Tipperary Brigade.—This Brigade acted in contravention of the Orders of G.H.Q., even previous to the ratification of the Treaty. G.H.Q. is at present in touch with all the Battalions in this area, and from reports it is evident that the rank and file are loyal to G.H.Q. Several hundred Volunteers from South Tipperary have signified their desire to join the Regular Army under G.H.Q.

Mid. Tipperary Brigade.—Majority Brigade Staff disloyal. New Staff appointed.

No. 1 Battalion.—Battalion and Companies Staff are loyal.

No. 2 Battalion.—Battalion and Companies Staff are loyal.

No. 3 Battalion.—Not yet re-organised, but from reports the majority are loyal to G.H.Q.

In all, eighteen out of twenty Companies in the Brigade stand by G.H.Q.

3rd SOUTHERN DIVISION.

All Divisional Staff in this Area, except the I.O., loyal to G.H.Q.

Tipperary No. 1 Brigade.—

All Brigade Staff loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 1 Battalion.—Battalion Staff, except Commandant and Vice-Commandant, and three out of five Companies, loyal to G.H.Q.

No. 2 Battalion.—All Staff with G.H.Q., and all Companies except one.

No. 4 Battalion.—All Battalion Staff, except Vice-Commandant and five out of six Companies loyal to G.H.Q.

In other Battalion Areas the majority of the Officers are disloyal, but arrangements are being made to get new Battalion Staffs from the loyal rank and file.

Leix No. 1 Brigade.—

Brigade, Battalion, and Company Staffs and men, with a few exceptions, loyal to G.H.Q.

Leix No. 2 Brigade.—

Brigade, Battalion, and Company Staffs and men loyal to G.H.Q.

In these Areas the Officers went with the Executive owing to gross misrepresentation of facts, but have since returned.

Offally No. 1 Brigade.—

Brigade Commandant and Adjutant loyal. Remainder disloyal and replaced. Officers' standing by G.H.Q. are being arrested in this Area.

Offally No. 2 Brigade.—

Brigade Staff disloyal. All 3rd Battalion and 50 per cent. of the remainder loyal to G.H.Q.

THE ARMY AS IT IS.

The above summary indicates the position of the I.R.A. In 12 out of the 16 Divisions G.H.Q. has 75 per cent. of the Army, and in the remaining four Divisions between 30 and 50 per cent. Organisation is difficult owing to the Organisers and loyal Officers being arrested on no other charge than that they have the courage to stand by G.H.Q. Those Officers who have not gone on hunger-strike are still detained. How different is the treatment meted out by G.H.Q., who have released mutinous troops found carrying arms in the vicinity of attacks, and who are found in possession of stolen motor cars.

G.H.Q. was never in a stronger position than now, enjoying, as it does, the loyalty and confidence of a fairly equipped, well-trained, and well-disciplined Army, which has the respect and devotion of a grateful people.

EASTER WEEK, 1922

Many Attacks on Irish Soldiers.

15 **SUNDAY.**—Armed men from 44 Parnell Square, Dublin, attempted to seize car in which Mr. M. Collins and the Adjutant-General of the I.R.A. had travelled. A bomb and revolver found on prisoner taken by Mr. M. Collins.

16 **MONDAY.**—G.H.Q. (Beggar's Bush Barracks) enfiladed by rifle fire from several points.

Lieut. Wilson (motor-cycling) fired at in Rathmines Road.

Cill-Droichid I.R.A. Barracks attacked.

Sentries at Tallaght Aerodrome fired upon.

Five armed men found crouching near guard at Amiens St. Station. Shots exchanged with guard.

Bde. Comdt. John Linehan and Vice-Comdt. D. Crowley seized by armed men in Kenmare while organising for G.H.Q.

17 **TUESDAY.**—Troops at Wellington Barracks fired upon. One of the guard wounded. Several shots fired at Dundrum Barracks.

Sergt. of the I.R.A. fired on at Mount St. Bridge.

18 **WEDNESDAY.**—Guard at the following posts sniped at:—Thompson's Garage, Hopkins and Hopkins, City Hall, Bank of Ireland, Transport Depot, South Wall, Telephone Exchange (one of the guard wounded).

19 **THURSDAY.**—Party of I.R.A. troops taking rations from Wellington Barracks to an outpost fired on in Bachelor's Walk, Capel Street (where fire came from roofs of houses and windows), and Halston Street.

Lieut. Wynne fired on in College Green.

Wellington Barracks attacked with machine guns and bombs. Three of the garrison wounded.

20 **FRIDAY.**—Sergt. Murray fired on while cycling along Haddington Road.

IRISH OFFICER MURDERED.

Distinguished Soldier's Tragic End.

In the death of Brigadier-General Adamson, O.C., Athlone Brigade, the Irish Army loses one of its most chivalrous and distinguished officers. On Monday, midnight, Brigadier Adamson was held up by an armed party in the streets of Athlone, and called upon to put his hands up. He complied with the order, and was then done to death in a cowardly and callous fashion. A revolver was placed against his head and discharged. He fell mortally wounded, and died ten hours later.

The late Brigadier Adamson earned a high record for valour during the late war in Ireland. He also took part in the European war, and was awarded the D.C.M. of the British Army for conspicuous gallantry on the field. The crime caused a sensation in Athlone, where the deceased officer had earned general esteem and respect.

While leaving a shop in Dunshaughlin, Brigadier-Adjutant Dunne, 1st Meath Brigade,, was attacked by an armed party, who ordered him to put his hands up, which he declined to do. He was then fired upon at point-blank range, and seriously wounded in the chest. The wounded officer has been taken to a Dublin hospital for treatment.

One of the most deplorable features of these attacks is, that Irishmen have been found to fire upon their fellow-countrymen in the ranks of the National Army.

NOTES ON TRAINING.

THE REVOLVER.

It must be clearly understood that the revolver is a short range weapon, effective up to 75 yards. The steadying influences of the use of both hands and the shoulder rest, as with the rifle are lacking, and it is therefore absolutely necessary that the recruit becomes familiar with certain principles before he can shoot accurately with the revolver.

The cleaning and oiling of the weapon have an important bearing upon its accuracy. When an action is over, or as soon after as possible the "piece" should be thoroughly cleaned and oiled, this will reduce labour and eliminate the possibility of the weapon becoming "pitted" that is the formation of rust in the barrel, or tiny holes which will eventually mar its accuracy.

In **LOADING** the cartridges should be firmly pressed down in the chambers of the cylinder so that the rims or the cartridges will not strike the frame when the cylinder is in position. The hammer should then be partially cocked so as to

enable the operator to spin the cylinder, thereby making sure that the cartridges will clear the frame.

"DOUBLE ACTION" should never be used. By double action is meant the cocking of the hammer by squeezing on the trigger until the hammer is mechanically cocked and fired. This entails a pressure of approximately 15 pounds as against 5 when the hammer is already cocked. The extra muscular effort used in double action deranges the aim, and when it is considered that a derangement of the barrel of $\frac{1}{8}$ of an inch at a target 25 yards away will mean a miss of at least 8 inches much of the poor shooting and missing is accounted for

In firing never pull or snap the trigger. The hammer should first be cocked with the thumb of the right hand, and then the trigger carefully squeezed with the forefinger of the firing hand. An even steady squeeze on the trigger, the operator at the same time endeavouring to better his aim will invariably lead to good results.

The revolver should be held firmly but never with too tight a grip. If grasped too tight a certain tension of the arm muscles will result, which will be transmitted in the form of vibration, thus deranging the aim.

A good aim is the correct alignment of three things:—the rear sight, the fore sight, and the target. This alignment is commonly called the "line of sight."

The cocking of the hammer, the aiming and sighting, and the careful squeezing of the trigger, *without the use of ammunition* should be practised as often as possible. This will familiarise the operator with the proper manipulation of the weapon and also rapidly improve his aiming when in action. This practice is absolutely essential, and can be successfully carried out in any room or place of concealment, a circular object *not larger than a sixpence* should be used as an aiming mark or target.

Remember that one man shooting accurately will cause more havoc and confusion among the enemy than forty men shooting and taking "pot" shots and uselessly expending ammunition.

NIGHT PATROLS.

1. Night Patrols may be divided into three classes:—

- (a) Patrols sent out to gain information.
- (b) Patrols sent to kill, capture or harass the enemy.
- (c) Patrols for protection.

2. The following points are applicable to all patrols:—

- (1) Each man must know the object of the patrol and his own individual duty.

- (2) The ground should be carefully studied by day.
- (3) Patrols should not go out until they have their "night eyes."
- (4) While the value of cover and the need for caution should be fully understood, men should also realise what liberties can be safely taken and avoid unnecessary crawling and delay.
- (5) The whole Patrol should not be moving at the same time; at least one man should always be listening.
- (6) Movement should be on a pre-arranged programme, men keeping touch with their neighbours.
- (7) The Patrol should be motionless the moment a flare goes up. The best time to move is when it has just gone up.
- (8) A Patrol is as easily seen and ambushed when returning as when going out. The return journey, therefore, should be made with caution and by a different route.
- (9) All concerned should be notified of the place and time of the departure and return of the Patrol.
- (10) Men going out on patrol should have nothing on them which would assist the enemy if they were captured.

THE HUNGER STRIKE WEAPON.

Utilised by Irish Officers.

Appended is a list of I.R.A. Officers who were seized by armed irregulars and unlawfully imprisoned, for no other reason than that they were loyal to G.H.Q. Many of the Officers, who were engaged on the work of organisation, were obliged to hunger-strike to regain their liberty.

Their names are:—

Comdt. Ahearne.

Comdt. Keane.

Captain Hyde.

Captain Cashman.

Vice-Comdt. Lyons (badly beaten when arrested).

Vice-Brigadier M. Athy.

Brigade Commandant John Linehan.

Vice-Comdt. David Crowley.

Comdt. Coyle (with others).

Comdt. Paul.

THE PEOPLE'S ARMY.

AFTER the incidents of the past few days in and about Dublin the people are slowly beginning to realise the gravity of the situation to which the division brought about in the Army is leading. The attempt to set up an armed force in the country responsible to no government, and subservient to no civil authority, immediately creates a menace to the personal freedom of every citizen in the State. It is sought to substitute the rule of the gun for government deriving its sanction and authority from the will of the people. And to achieve this end Irishmen who fought as brothers and comrades in the field are being arrayed against each other.

A time has now been reached when Irishmen are found to turn their arms against their fellow-countrymen; when armed men wait about street corners with the sole purpose of firing on Irish Volunteers wearing the uniform of the Irish Republican Army. Yet the soldiers on whom those attacks are made belong to the only army in Ireland to-day which bears the same relation to the people the armies of liberty throughout the world bear to their peoples. They stand for personal liberty over and above all else. Their lives are pledged to the one purpose of securing that the people shall be free to express their will on any great issue that may come before them. They are the servants, not the masters, in the State.

When they are assailed, the principle of democratic government, the sacred fundamental right of the weakest subject in the State to personal freedom is attacked. The cause they defend is a high and holy one, and it is because of this they must stand four square against any effort to impose a new tyranny on the Nation.

But in defending this principle our soldiers must always remember that they belong to the People's Army. When they move through the streets of our cities and towns they must realise that they are Irish soldiers on service amongst their own people. The Army is going through a period of crisis and stress, no less strenuous than that experienced during the war. The present is a time when discipline, cool, clear thinking, and those qualities of self-control and restraint that make the true soldier, are our greatest asset.

To-day we are under the fire of public opinion; a fire no less searching than that of the enemies' guns. See to it, then, Volunteers, that you come through the ordeal with honour

and credit to the Army. Whether on or off duty our officers and men must ever keep in mind the uniform they wear, and by word or act do nothing to lessen its respect in the minds of the people. No doubt at times we may be subjected to severe provocation, but this should be the test of our endurance and patience; the test of our fitness to act as defenders of the people's rights.

Trust elicits trust, as confidence inspires confidence, and the measure of the confidence and trust we shall win from the people shall be proportion to that trust and confidence which we ourselves inspire.

We are Irish soldiers on service amongst our own people. We owe them much for the courageous stand they took during the war. Let no circumstance ever lead us to forget this important fact.

We are essentially the People's Army.

FROM THE OUTPOSTS.

On Easter Sunday night the first concerted attack was made on a post held by Irish soldiers, when fire was opened from several points on the General Headquarters of the Irish Republican Army at Beggar's Bush Barracks. The attacking party occupied positions overlooking the barrack square, and opened fire about midnight. The guard were turned out, and a heavy exchange of fire, lasting about twenty minutes, ensued. Subsequently the city was patrolled, and several men carrying revolvers disarmed.

* * *

From Monday onwards the policy of sniping at the posts occupied by I.R.A. troops in the metropolis has been pursued, and night after night the citizens have been alarmed and disturbed by continuous volleys of fire. This is part of the terrorist campaign to stampede and intimidate the people. By such methods the enemy forces sought to create their reign of terror. Until parties of armed men on foot and in motor cars moved about the streets and fired upon Irish soldiers the quiet of the city during the night was undisturbed. The soldiers of the I.R.A. stand for order and peace, and if they are obliged to take any action that may cause discomfiture or apprehension amongst the civil population, it is in the nature of protective, or self-defensive, measures.

2nd EASTERN DIVISION.

Later in the week—on Wednesday night—several posts occupied by regular troops in Dublin were enfladed by rifle fire, or sniped at from the house tops. These posts included the City Hall, the Bank of Ireland, Hopkins and Hopkins, Thompson's Garage, and the Telephone Exchange. The activities of the irresponsible armed parties did not cease here. Regular forces taking rations from Wellington Barracks to an outpost were fired upon at several points, passing through the city streets. In Capel Street the fire came from the windows of houses occupied by the attackers. That any body of Irishmen should lend themselves to such deliberate and matured designs on the lives of their own kith and kin seems almost incredible. The heroic sacrifices of the past few years, the fine spirit of comradeship that once knit those who braved the dangers of the war of liberation together, furnish a sorry commentary on the incidents of the past week.

* * *

Thursday night saw a repetition of the policy of attacking posts held by Irish Volunteers, when a vigorous assault was directed against Wellington Barracks, the Headquarters of the 2nd Eastern Division. During the war with England no massed attack was made on a barrack in Dublin. The British Auxiliary Police Forces were allowed to remain undisturbed in their Headquarters at Beggar's Bush. It was only when Irish soldiers went into occupation, the time was thought opportune to enflade the building. Machine guns and bombs were never utilised in an attack on a Barracks in Dublin until Irish soldiers, under the command of Comdt. Genl. Tom Ennis made Wellington their Headquarters. Then with a display of militancy, that even the tensest war period had not provoked, these resources of warfare were used in a futile attack on this post of the Irish Republican Army. Those who direct an operation of this kind, invoke the sacred name of Liberty, while they pursue a course that aims at making every unarmed citizen in the State a bond-slave. The true soldiers of freedom are these whose lives are pledged to uphold personal freedom, and with it the right to National freedom. It is the clear realisation of this principle that has made the great soldiers of history.

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Brigade Comdt. John Linehan and Brigade Vice-Comdt. David Crowley, both of Rathmore, Co. Kerry. who were reorganising the I.R.A. units in their native county, were arrested by armed men in Kenmare last week and forcibly detained. Both officers went on hunger-strike as a protest against the arbitrary action of their captors, and after several days' fast they regained their freedom.

THE following posts in the 2nd Eastern Division are occupied by Regular Forces of the I.R.A. :—
 Beggars' Bush Barracks; Marlboro' Hall; Wellington Barracks; Oriel House; City Hall; Bank of Ireland; Recruiting Office, Great Brunswick Street; Thompson's Garage; Burke's Distillery; Provisional Government Buildings; Transport Shed, South Wall; Martin's Timber Factory; Westland Row Station; Amiens Street Station; Broadstone Station; Boland's Mill, Ringsend; Aldborough House; Telephone Exchange; Shelbourne Hotel; Hopkins and Hopkins; Luke Street Munition Factory; Vicar Street Munition Factory; Amiens Street Post Office; *Freeman's Journal* Office; Soldiers' Home, Parkgate Street; O'Mara's Bacon Factory; Keogh's Bacon Factory; Greystones Coast Guard Station; Dun Laoghaire, Howth, Wicklow and Arklow Coast Guard Stations; Baldoyle Police Barrack; Howth Police Barrack; Wicklow Police Barrack; Y.M.C.A. Hall, Dun Laoghaire; Clonskeagh Castle; Treaty Election Rooms; Bridewell; Kings' Inns; Green Street Courthouse; and Tallaght Aerodrome.

APPOINTMENTS AND PROMOTIONS.

1st EASTERN DIVISION.

Col.-Comdt. Eamonn Cullen, Divisional Engineer, 1st Eastern Division, has been appointed Deputy O.C. Division.

NORTHERN DIVISION.

Col.-Comdt. S. Mac Caoilte, Secretary to Chief of Staff, has been appointed O.C. of the Northern Division, with rank of Commandant-General. Comdt.-Genl. Mac Caoilte has been one of the most efficient officers of the army in Ulster, and has won a fine service record as a soldier during the war. His appointment has given much pleasure to the soldiers throughout his Division. Comdt.-Genl. Mac Caoilte has left G.H.Q. to take over his command in the North.

Communications.—1st Lieut. P. Dalton promoted to be Staff Captain.

Army Publicity.—H. G. Smith promoted to be Staff Captain.

NEW POSTS OCCUPIED.

THE following stations have recently been occupied by Regular I.R.A. troops :—Kildare (No. 1) Police Barrack; Kildare (No. 2) Police Barrack; Tallaght Military Camp; Dundalk Military Barrack; Kildare Military Barrack; Mullingar Military Barrack.

IN THE WEST.

In the 1st Western Division the following posts have been occupied, during the past week, by Regular I.R.A. troops :—Gort Workhouse; Kilkee Coastguard Station; Ennistymon Workhouse (Headquarters Mid-Clare Brigade); and Woodford Barracks. On Wednesday morning a party of armed men took possession of Woodford Barracks. On Wednesday evening Comdt. M. Hogan and Capt. Reilly, with a party of the regular forces, regained possession of the post. The building were taken to Loughrea and subsequently released.

